Friday, September 5, 2003
Discussion of Section III of Staff Working Paper, “U.S.
Public Policy and the Biotechnologies that Touch the Beginnings
of Human Life: Draft Recommendations”
Session 6: Biotechnology & Public Policy: Proposed Interim
CHAIRMAN KASS: Why don't we get started, please?
At the moment there are no sign-ups for public comment. Why don't
I suggest depending on how this goes, but let's aim for an adjournment
at noon or earlier, you know, if the irenic spirit descends and
we find ourselves in full agreement on this and that. We could
leave as early—
DR. FOSTER: Yes, several of us have to leave
at 11:30 for flights.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Then let the irenic spirit arrive
earlier than that.
Let me begin by saying something about this particular part of
the document, and let me put it in a slightly more grandiose place.
You might remember that President Bush, when he met with this
Council on the day of our first meeting in January of 2002, urged
us to be the conscience of the nation in matters bioethical. He
didn't explain what that meant exactly. It was, however, I
think to be understood not as a charge to this or that particular
moral conclusion, but rather to the kind of moral seriousness, a
most appropriate charge seeing that we are, in fact, an ethics Council
in an area fraught with enormous human significance.
We're not an economics council, not a public health or scientific
research council, but we're concerned really with questions
of public right and of common good and not simply our own private
Second, on several of the large ethical questions that have emerged
on our agenda, we are deeply and probably permanently divided:
the question of the moral standing of the early stages of human
life being the most obvious issue in which that's true.
Nevertheless, I think it's fair to say that there are other
moral questions, matters of deep human import where I trust that
we are not divided or at least not unbridgeably so, and insofar
as we try to serve as the nation's conscience and teacher in
these matters, we shouldn't be shy about saying so.
Third, we have in our approach to bioethics tried to begin where
possible not simply with the conundrums that technology poses, but
with a clear eye on some of the human goods that we wish to defend
And it seems to me as we look at this particular area of biotechnology
and explore its human significance, we would be remiss as an ethics
Council charged with this task if we failed to try to articulate
some of those goods that we share and offer some suggestions, if
they are sensible, about how those goods might best be promoted
And the material presented in Part III of this working paper is,
in fact, presented in that spirit and with that intention. It is,
I confess, the part of this enterprise that is especially dear to
me because it's an opportunity to articulate and give effective
voice to things that are important to the integrity and dignity
of human procreation.
It's an opportunity to suggest or even direct different kinds
of interim boundaries as this field moves towards a possible way
of regulating itself, interim boundaries that we would not allow
roguish or irresponsible people to cross before the public could
deliberate and decide about the ethical and social implications
of doing so.
It's an opportunity to show that pro- lifers, scientists,
and people of all other kinds of stripes can actually join in suggesting
certain kinds of boundaries; that the scientists, for example, are
not simply interested in just full steam ahead, but they are moral
and responsible beings; that people who ordinarily wouldn't
enter such a conversation because it seems to involve the defense
of embryos only might find a way to join with others on those places
where we could agree.
And it is, I think, a way to see if we can find a way around the
moral and legislative impasse that exists when the battles are formed
solely or mainly about the human embryo.
So those are among the reasons why I'm particularly interested
to see whether there's something here that we can do.
And what this last part of the working paper that's presented
for discussion attempts to do is to suggest certain kinds of principles
and desiderata regarding the dignity of human procreation and under
each one suggest possible kinds of measures that the people's
representatives might consider enacting as interim measures while
the conversation about further regulatory possibilities continues.
I think that's the spirit in which this is to be read. I
think we should proceed by the discussion of the principles first
and then look at some of the particulars.
I know that among the particulars that have been placed here there
will be some that will meet objections. Quite frankly, there is
the expectation that not everybody is going to agree on those, and
where there isn't agreement, I think the general sense should
be they should be taken out.
We're searching for certain kinds of—I think these are very
modest. I think they're rather minimal sorts of things, though
not everybody might agree, but I would like to begin by suggesting
that we look at the principles on page 13; that due regard for the
integrity and dignity of human procreation might mean (a) a respect
for the humanity of human procreation, preserving a clear boundary
between the human and the nonhuman or between the human and the
animal; respect for women and human pregnancy, protecting them against
certain exploitative and degrading practices; respect for the children
who would be born with assisted reproductive technologies, securing
for them the same rights and human attachments naturally available
to children conceived in vivo; and respect for the early
stages of nascent human life, at least this much setting some agreed
upon boundaries of why embryos may be made and/or how they may be
used and treated.
This is an attempt to say that respecting the dignity of human
procreation involves these different at least articulable aspects.
We can then look more particularly under—and it might turn out
that the conversation is best had in the particulars, but that's
what I think Michael is suggesting.
But if someone wants to just very briefly say something about
the principles as a whole. Michael.
PROF. SANDEL: Well, I hesitate to raise this
first because it doesn't seem to me the most important point,
but it comes up in the principles, and if that's what you want
to discuss first, then I would raise it under this heading.
Principle number one seems on the face of it unexceptionable.
Preserving a clear boundary between the human and the nonhuman,
and it relates to the paragraph at the bottom of the page after
the principles, proposing that Congress ban or have a moratorium
on human-animal chimeras and so on.
I myself find the prospect of human-animal chimeras unappealing
and troubling, but that is not a subject that I've thought very
much about, that this Council has devoted a single session to.
I'm aware that there are very deep differences and interesting
philosophical and theological differences between Judeo-Christian
moral traditions which do mark out very clear boundaries between
human beings and nature and Eastern religions, including Hinduism
and Confucianism, among others, that conceive or understand there
to be a continuity of a kind that's unfamiliar to the intuitions
of those of us raised in this tradition.
I think it would be an interesting philosophical question worth
devoting a session to, but since this Council hasn't addressed
any session to the discussion of the relation between human beings
and the natural world and the continuities and discontinuities,
though I don't have a disagreement with, at an intuitive level,
rejecting, having Congress pass—I don't feel that I'm
ready or that this Council is ready to take a position on the whole
question of the relation between human beings and animals.
And I would just mention as an example in the debate about genetically
modified food and organisms, there were those who instinctively,
you know, rejected the idea of transgenic manipulations that put
the flounder gene into a strawberry so that it wouldn't freeze
as readily. Some found that intuitively very unattractive, and
others argued in defense of it.
So now that's a less maybe faithful question than the one
of human beings in relation to nature and animals, but we just haven't
discussed that question. Why are we asking Congress or suggesting
that Congress enact something that we haven't discussed at all?
CHAIRMAN KASS: The question is open. Bill.
DR. HURLBUT: Well, from a slightly different
perspective, I think we have to be very careful on this subject
because the scientific possibilities are—first of all, they're
very hard to define. For example, Catherine Verfaillie has put
adult at least mouse, maybe human MAPCs, into the blastocysts of
mouse embryos. So it's not blastomeres or gametes we have to
deal with here in this question. It's a much broader scientific
And, second, there will be a lot of good uses for the kind of
things that Michael just mentioned. There are already research
models. For example, there are combinations using different techniques
of developing mice with human neurons in them that may provide very
good study models.
We certainly want to be careful not to preclude good science.
I would just say that I think this is part of a larger category
we need to consider or it would be good if we could consider or
somebody needs to consider which takes into account this very interesting
If gene transfer doesn't define the locus of human dignity,
I don't think putting a human neuron into a mouse makes it—it doesn't make it into Mickey Mouse. It doesn't start
talking. I don't think it's—
CHAIRMAN KASS: It doesn't say anything
DR. HURLBUT: No, I understand, but what I'm
saying is as written, I think I could agree with what's on here,
but we're entering into a territory that has many very subtle
scientific issues in it.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Let me hold back and let others
participate in this, please.
PROF. MEILAENDER: There are a couple different
issues on the board. I mean, one is the more general one Michael
raises, and I just have to think about that. I mean, you're
right. We haven't devoted any session precisely to the discussion
of this. It obviously relates to things that we've discussed
in other ways, but we haven't, and I need to ponder that a bit.
I just need to be instructed with the more specific matter, whether
the kind of genetic engineering that Michael was talking about with
respect to non-animal forms of life or what you were talking about,
Bill, has to do with the creation of like a hybrid embryo, for instance.
You weren't really talking about that, were you?
What you're talking about falls short of that or not?
DR. HURLBUT: It's not creating an embryo
to take to term. It's creating a research model. Are we specifically
talking about the creation of taking something to term?
PROF. MEILAENDER: I didn't read it that
way. I read it as simply creating a hybrid embryo.
DR. HURLBUT: Well, see, my point is if you
can take a human MAPC and put it into the blastocyst of a mouse
embryo, you can get a model of the development of human tissues.
Now, whether that's good or bad we should talk about, but
that kind of thing is being done, and there is some very interesting
science coming forward with it.
And we want to be careful not to—I mean, it needs moral discernment.
That's all. I mean, maybe as a moratorium or a temporary area
we would delineate, maybe that's okay, but I think we have to
recognize that this is a subject that needs to be talked about,
not one that we need to just take the first and natural reaction;
we don't want to create human-animal hybrids.
There will be very good scientific uses for this technology is
what I'm saying.
CHAIRMAN KASS: And does that—Elizabeth, excuse
PROF. BLACKBURN: This does speak to something
general in this section that I noticed, which was that I didn't
see distinctions between something in order to produce a child as
opposed to creating something for research purposes. In a number
of places I was confused as to what was meant, and this is an example
CHAIRMAN KASS: Rebecca.
PROF. DRESSER: Having read some about transgenic
animals, there are some philosophical discussions about, say, you
had a chimpanzee and you put in new human genes. How many human
genes would it take before it became a chimera?
And I don't think there's been any agreement on that.
So that would be another issue.
PROF. SANDEL: In fact, if I could just add
that this isn't merely a hypothetical. The kind of thing Rebecca
is doing, the internal Harvard Ethics Review Board has had to deal
with a question very like this, and the answer isn't obvious
to me. I don't feel equipped, now certainly, to know exactly
what the science is, what the ethical questions are. We simply
haven't discussed any of this.
It's interesting. It's worthwhile, I think, but we should
CHAIRMAN KASS: The larger question about the
human / animal boundary with the movement of genes and so on and
cells is a question we have not taken up, and it is a possible question
for this Council.
And in an earlier draft of this, things were written up in a more
almost legislatively looking way, and it would be possible to write
in the disclaimers of what this was not.
As I understand what's here, this has to do not with the transfer
of a few genes or not with the transfer of a cell, but producing
a being that is an animal-human chimera limited in this way: combining
a human gamete, egg, or sperm with a gamete from any nonhuman species,
or by taking two early embryos, one human and one nonhuman, and
mixing them together to produce some kind of intermediate form.
This is not yet about for procreative purposes, but this is a
suggestion that I guess the question is are we comfortable saying
that in the absence of careful understanding of what this might
mean, that let somebody go do it and we'll worry about it later,
or is this one of the boundaries in which one wants to say in the
absence of full discussion of what this might mean, let's have
a temporary restraint on it?
If there's disagreement, it disappears, but I think that was
the spirit in which it was offered, granting that the larger questions
about animal-human mixing is yet to be had.
The second point, by the way, about the transfer of human embryo
into the body of any member of a nonhuman species has come up in
the context of the discussions of the further reaches of embryo
research and of cloned embryos.
Paul, Mary Ann, Elizabeth, in that order.
DR. McHUGH: I just want to follow on after
Elizabeth's comment. We're talking here about procreative,
reproductive studies, are we? Because remember we did touch briefly
upon this back in the SCNT and the cloning arena when, again, the
problem of SCNT demanding huge numbers of human eggs to be nucleated
seemed a burden, again, to women.
We did discuss the possibility that for stem cell research that
any ennucleated animal ova would work here and that that might be
one of the ways that the science would advance, not to produce a
chimera of being, but rather to produce stem cells from a person
that would then be available to that person for repair.
And that's not being discussed here, is it? That's why
I'm following on after Elizabeth's question. I mean, if
it's procreation and producing chimeras, that's one kind
of thing. If, on the other hand, we're denying ourselves right
now the direction where SCNT might go for stem cells, we should
really think very seriously about that.
CHAIRMAN KASS: This was not intended to cover
the human nucleus into a rabbit egg, and that could be made explicit.
PROF. BLACKBURN: I think this needs—I'm
seeing some real concerns here, and Bill started to raise this issue.
So what if somebody takes a legitimate, you know, preapproved human
embryonic stem cell and wants to put it into a mouse model system?
You've just said that is not going to be—i.e., a mouse embryo
model system to study those cells, which I think would be taken
as a very reasonable mode of study. This would not allow that kind
of thing to happen.
So I think there may be some unintended consequences from the
vagueness of this.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Well, let me put the general—Dan, did you want to this? There was somebody else in line.
I've now forgotten. Was it Mary Ann? Yes, sorry.
PROF. GLENDON: Not on that particular point,
but a general suggestion.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Go ahead. Turn your mic on
and go ahead.
PROF. GLENDON: Okay. I think before we get more
into the details of the specific measures, it might be useful to
think about our relationship as a Council to what the President
asked us to do, the way we've conceived of our mission in general
as raising the level of national conversation on a number of issues,
and then our possible relation to what Congress might do.
That last thing is a new area for us, and I just want to float
this suggestion that it might be that the most useful thing we could
do here is to announce our consensus if it is possible. It would
be very impressive to have a consensus on this Council on the four
principles in the report.
And second, to suggest the need for Congress to consider interim
measures without specifying what those measures might be. We could
elaborate on the issues that we've identified, but keep in mind
that before Congress did anything in this area, Congress itself
would have legislative hearings
CHAIRMAN KASS: Do you want to address the general
DR. ROWLEY: Following on with
Mary Ann's suggestion and then going back and looking in a sense
even more carefully at the four items at the top of page 13, I wonder
for Item 4, respect for early stages of nascent human life, setting
some agreed upon boundaries. Then it's on "why embryos
may be made and how they may be used and treated."
And I'm not sure particularly with the last part of the phrase
"how they may be used and treated" whether we really want
to enter into that kind of suggesting that Congress consider legislation
in this area when that's an area that's still, if you will,
So I guess I certainly have no problem with saying that there
should be respect for early stages of nascent human life, but I
think that we should make it a more general statement.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Well, let me response to Mary
Ann's more general point unless someone else would like to.
I certainly hope that there—and Janet indicated that the language
may have to be refined even in the formulation of the general principles.
I'm not sure I like that the way it is now written. Its full
meaning comes out, I think, when you see some of the particulars
that are added.
Assuming that we could get an agreement on these very modest proposals
or whatever modest proposals survive the discussions, I think it
would be much more useful to, in fact, suggest something that looks
like specific legislation for the reason that it would produce the
kind of discussion that the mere hortatory suggestion that Congress
might consider this might not produce.
You have, after all, over there an impasse on the one piece of
legislation on cloning. Is that impasse simply to frustrate all
possible efforts to have some kind of interim measures that would
at least hold certain kinds of lines while the society continues
to deliberate about these things and while one looks for ways to
monitor and regulate these activities?
Here would be an opportunity, assuming we could agree, to make
a suggestion for something very, very modest and, I think, concrete.
Now, if you can't do it, you can't do it, but I think
I've learned at least one thing, that if you want people to
pay attention to the seriousness of your reflection, sometimes it
helps to suggest that they do something, and otherwise it's
a nice report. You just go away. It was nice. Thank you very
Now, they can still say, "Go away. Thank you very much,"
but at least there's a concrete proposal out there to fight
with, at least for someone to consider taking up.
And I may be wrong about that, Mary Ann, but please come back.
PROF. GLENDON: Well, I think to suggest the need
for legislation on interim measures is concrete, and maybe in the
course of the discussion we can get even more specific than that
about certain interim measures. My guess is that we might be able
to get consensus on some, but not on others.
But just as Item No. 1 opens up a great number of questions and
intersects with a great number of questions, that Congress would
have to consider and that we haven't fully considered, these
other items similarly do.
For example, in three—can I make a comment about three or do
you want to wait?
CHAIRMAN KASS: Well, go ahead. You have the
PROF. GLENDON: I just would point out the idea
of legislators acting to make certain that no child conceived by
means of artificial reproductive technologies be denied two adult
human biological parents. There is a whole range of questions that
are heating up currently and that have been addressed by other countries
on access to artificial procreation by persons of the same sex.
I think Americans have not generally come to terms with the fact
that civil union legislation in practically every country in the
world that has it specifically forbids access to artificially assisted
means of reproduction.
There's just a whole hornet's nest of issues here that
are related to the issues that we're posing.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Michael.
PROF. SANDEL: Well, I think that we can and
should do as Mary Ann has often reminded us, contribute to framing
national public debate about questions as we did with the cloning
issue, and I think as you, Leon, suggest, one way of doing that
is to see if we can agree on some recommendations to Congress.
And I think that we might well be able to do both of those things
if we devoted one or two sessions to this question of transgenic.
There are two issues that have come out in this discussion that
could be the basis for an agenda for that. One would be what counts
as a hybrid, which is what Bill and Rebecca and Elizabeth have raised.
And the other question, also a philosophical question, but at
another level, is just as with reproductive cloning, almost everyone
came into that discussion not liking it, but we had some very interesting
discussions trying to sort out why. What were the reasons for objecting
to reproductive cloning, and what did they commit us to?
Likewise, with human-animal chimeras, I suspect most people around
the table don't like that any more than they like reproductive
cloning, but actually sorting out what's wrong with it and examining
whether those reasons are supportable and what else they might commit
us to, that might be worthwhile, very interesting.
In any case, it's nothing that we've done yet. So we
could very well make recommendations, and they might well be consensus
recommendations, but I think we need to have a couple of sessions
CHAIRMAN KASS: Jim Wilson.
PROF. WILSON: I agree with Michael. I do not
think that stating the four general propositions on the top of page
13 will command any legislative attention whatsoever because the
legislators will disagree as to what these phrases mean, and in
the course of their hearings they may put in there things that we
as a council, perhaps unanimously, would find quite objectionable.
We have to flesh out what these mean, enough to get the process
started in a way that may make some sense, and we have disagreement
about chimera. We have concerns to me about restrictions on so-called
surrogate parentcy, at least for pay. We haven't talked about
This is an extremely complicated question. There are many court
cases to which we can refer.
Later on we talk about we shouldn't preserve any embryo past
the tenth day. Well, why the tenth? I mean, in the past we've
talked about the 14th. The British talk about the 14th. So that
my recommendation is that we return this Section III to the staff
to see if the four principles, which taken simply as principles
are general enough to command a lot of dissent, but not much agreement,
and see if they can spell out what is meant and what is not meant,
and provide us perhaps with alternative meanings so that we can
choose among alternative meanings.
In the end, we may not have a consent, but we will learn a lot
from the effort to find out whether we have a consent, and surprisingly,
we may. And if we do, then that's an advantage to the legislature
that goes well beyond simply stating the four general goals.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Rebecca.
PROF. DRESSER: I agree that it would make more
of an impact if we could give examples and agree on some principles,
but I also agree that we need more facts and more analysis.
Another topic, on page 14, the middle paragraph about the two
parents, there are these infertility approaches, ooplasm transfer
and some other things where you have children with two mothers.
Now, maybe we want to say that's not a good idea, but I feel
uncomfortable because I want to have some more exploration and some
more scientific background before I take that stance.
On the other hand, I do think, for example, this principle number
two, respect for women and human pregnancy, I would change it to
"preventing certain risky, exploitative, and degrading practices."
I think that is strengthened by the example of not permitting
a pregnancy purely to produce a fetus for research purposes. I
think that's a stance that almost everyone would agree on.
I know I have some colleagues who wouldn't agree with that,
but I think that's fairly noncontroversial.
And so in that sense I think the principle itself could be read
quite broadly, but giving the example improves on the recommendation.
So I do think that they would be stronger if we could give some
examples, but I think we need more of an evidentiary basis before
we do that.
CHAIRMAN KASS: What do you mean by an evidentiary
PROF. DRESSER: Some more scientific background
on some of these specifics. Certainly this ten-day limitation,
why ten days? Some philosophical analysis, some—
CHAIRMAN KASS: Yeah, well, I don't know
who else wants to weigh in on this, but what more do you need to
know? What more do you need to know before you'd be prepared
to say that it's really a bad idea to transfer a human embryo
into a pig uterus?
Anybody here propose what we have to study in order to have a
conclusion on that?
CHAIRMAN KASS: Is there somebody who wants
to say that the benefits of scientific research of allowing the
embryo to grow up to three months in a nonhuman uterus so that we
can either study development or harvest the kidneys? Because that
Do we want to say that, well, we have to wait for the evidence,
or do we want to say, "Well, let's wait a see until somebody
What kind of scientific evidence or further moral discussion do
you want to say that it's really a bad idea. We think collectively
it's a bad idea. We might not be able to give the rational
reason, Michael, just as I don't think you could give the rational
reason for why we think incest is a bad idea, a sufficient rational
That we think it's a bad idea to induce women to bear experimental
animals as human fetuses, as experimental animals.
PROF. MEILAENDER: That's not what this
says. It implies it, but the way you said it makes it much more
direct and easily—
CHAIRMAN KASS: Take the point that Rebecca
raises. To prohibit the initiation of the human pregnancy, on page
14, using embryos produced ex vivo for purposes of research,
for purposes of security fetal tissues or organs for transplant
or for any purpose other than to attempt to produce a live born
The surrogacy I think is controversial. I'm happy to drop
it, but I'm wondering what kind of further scientific research
PROF. DRESSER: I gave that as an example of
a specific that I would feel comfortable supporting that now without
There are a lot of things thrown into this as examples, and I
think some of them we feel—
CHAIRMAN KASS: Well, then why don't we
take the example case by case and see if any survive?
PROF. DRESSER: Well, it seems there are three
categories. One might be examples that people would feel comfortable
agreeing on right now, and then there are examples that people would
say, "Well, I just don't think we should take a position
on that," and then a middle ground where people might say,
"Well, if we had more time to work this stuff through, we could
agree on it."
CHAIRMAN KASS: Okay. But, I mean, some general
comments or should we just look at the various things one by one
PROF. GLENDON: Maybe one general comment to keep
in mind something that came up, I think, in our very first meeting.
What's involved in the background of all of these issues is
where is the burden of proof supposed to be? Who ought to have
the burden even of demonstrating either that a measure is needed
or I think that's—if you wait for conclusive evidence—
CHAIRMAN KASS: No, that's well said, and
it seems to me the spirit of this is: look. We understand that
there are larger and challenging things being developed here. The
approach of this project has been to explore the way in which we
now monitor, review, and perhaps regulate these activities. We've
discovered that there isn't a lot that would regulate things
of this sort.
We are recommending that the inquiry into regulation continue,
but the question is whether in the light of certain kinds of rapidly
changing things on the ground and things that individuals are doing,
if you read the report of the European conference and the various
things reported there, there is reason to be concerned that particular
individuals, without consulting anybody else, for their own good
reasons will introduce new kinds of innovations.
And the question is: does one simply say, "Well, let's
wait and see," or does one, in fact, say in the absence of
adequate public discussion, the burden of proof lies with respect
to certain limited things, very limited things; the burden of proof
lies on those innovators to show why these particular kinds of human
goods, boundaries defending these human goods should be violated.
And this would be an attempt to lay down at least a few minimum
markers, in fact, to indicate that there is a burden of proof problem
with respect to some of the things that affect the question of the
dignity of human procreation.
I mean, I would say if you had one on each of these items I would
be myself content. I would think that if the question under the
humanity of human procreation were to simply limit the implantation
of human embryos and animal bodies, that's a limit, and it's
a limit which maybe we can't all articulate equally. I mean,
we can't agree on the reason, but it shouldn't be, it seems
to me, upon us simply the burden to state the reason. The presumption
is somebody else should show us why we should do that. The burden
And we can talk about it at some length. It seems to me similarly
with respect to the women, I don't think the burden is on us
to say why it is it would be a bad idea to treat women's bodies
as laboratories and to treat the womb as a place for anything other
than the nurturing and growth of a child.
I mean, if we're the conscience of the nation, how can we
not say anything but that?
And on the question of the respect for the embryo, the question
of the tenth day or the fourteenth day or what have you is arbitrary,
but there was general agreement around here before. Even the people
who wanted to create the embryos for research thought that the respect
that was owed the embryos was somehow required that there be some
kind of upper limit on which embryos used in research should be
And this is formulated here in a way in which the pro life people,
I think, might, in fact, be able to join it. Since embryos are
being used in research, is there for the time being, for the time
being, a society-wide agreement to use them, but not past this point?
That seems to me a reasonable, sensible thing for a society as
divided on the morality of this as we are to establish, and we've
had testimony here previously from people who, you know, favored
such kinds of boundaries.
And then on the question of the children, which is the vexed question,
and I take your point advisedly, Mary Ann, but to achieve that result,
one would have to have an embryo for a parent, and the question
is whether children born with the aid of assisted reproductive technologies
are—shouldn't we somehow secure for them, for the children
now, out of our interest for the children, the same rights and human
attachments that are available to children naturally conceived in
And does one really want to say—I mean, with the oocyte or the
ooplasm transfer is easily dealt with as we don't mean to cover
that, but one could say one doesn't really want children who
have four biological parents because they're the product of
the disaggregation and fusion of two embryos or that one, in effect,
says that one should not attempt to conceive a child save by the
union of egg and sperm attained from adults rather than from embryos
or fetuses or anybody like that.
That seems these are contestable, but the first three I think
Elizabeth and then Michael.
PROF. BLACKBURN: On first reading, one has
the sense that, yes, these are all very reasonable. What's
increasingly concerning me is as we look at them carefully, I realize
how unconsidered by the Council so many of these have been.
To take your very specific example of the four biological parents,
now, I understand that now naturally occurring in the human population,
at albeit low frequency, are cases in which exactly such natural
chimeras exist. Is that one you're talking about?
CHAIRMAN KASS: I think people can't hear
you; is that correct?
PROF. BLACKBURN: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm
So I'm getting increasingly concerned about while on first
reading the principles do look like something that, yes, reasonable
people like ideas, but the more I read them in the few days before
the meeting that we could look at it, the more concerned I am that
they haven't had the benefit of real discussion by Council and—
CHAIRMAN KASS: That's what we're doing.
That's what we're doing.
PROF. BLACKBURN: Yes, but there is a lot there.
And so, for example, the very specific case you raised of four biological
parents, my understanding is that there are, albeit rare, but natural
cases of human chimeras that naturally exist, and this has come
up now in the context of, well, how do you do DNA identification
because such things occur.
So, you know, immediately this starts to raise questions that
I just think we would be sort of hastily not taking account of here,
such as now are these people now to be recognized as, you know,
not proper people?
There are all sorts of things that start rising up out of this
even though I understand what you're saying. The general principles
seem good. On closer examination, the more concern I am feeling
about the unintended, as I said, misunderstandings that—
CHAIRMAN KASS: Are you suggesting, Elizabeth,
that—well, a general principle is if it happens rarely by nature,
it's perfectly okay for us to do it by art, but are you suggesting
that if somebody today simply wanted to create an embryo, a child
who had four biological parents, deliberately, but that's something
we should say, "Go ahead and do it"? Are you comfortable
PROF. BLACKBURN: Well, I don't know about
the specific example because we really haven't had time to think
CHAIRMAN KASS: But I'm asking you to think
PROF. BLACKBURN: And I might say if nature
has done it with no obvious harm to the naturally occurring individuals
who are now showing up as having had this, maybe this is not as
terrible as our gut instinct, as you imply, is thinking it is.
I don't know. That's the uncertainty, and yet I feel—
CHAIRMAN KASS: Twelve parents?
PROF. BLACKBURN: —hastily abandoning things
which perhaps we haven't had time to think about.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Frank.
PROF. FUKUYAMA: Well, Leon, I have a diagnosis
of what the problem is here because, you know, when you first suggested
this set of principles, you know, I thought it was a good idea,
but it does seem to me that the specific things that you would get
ready consensus on banning all tend to be a little bit science "fictiony"
or, you know, over the horizon and outlandish, and the reason that
we haven't considered a lot of these things is that we've
been reluctant to stray too far from things that are kind of here
So that's why we haven't had a long discussion about human-animal
chimeras, because nobody really seems to be that interested in doing
Another one that comes up, which is at Principle 3, I guess, union
of egg and sperm obtained directly from two parents, that means
you are excluding the possibility of gay couples using, you know,
ART at some future point, as someone suggested it will become possible
to produce a biological offspring.
We've not discussed whether gay parents have reproductive
rights like that, you know, because it's not possible right
now, but you know, people have suggested that that may be possible
in the future.
It has come up in the discussion of cloning, you know, the long-term
possibility that you would actually clone fetuses, you know, for
the purpose of harvesting organs and tissues, but again, we didn't
dwell on that very much because, you know, nobody is really pressing
very hard for that.
And so I think that's the problem we're having, is that
the things that we're going to get, you know, ready consensus
on are fairly outlandish things, and I don't know. Maybe it
would help to have, you know, I guess a more targeted list of those
But I guess in retrospect I'm not surprised that we haven't
discussed them because a lot of them, you know, are really things
that you can imagine happening in the next few years, but are not,
you know, immediate pressing things that people are, you know, clamoring
CHAIRMAN KASS: Bill May.
DR. MAY: I sense at the outset of the conversation,
in a sense, some feeling that we've already done the work, and
this merely scoops up what we've already kind of agreed to or
Mary Ann's point that, well, the burden of proof doesn't
lie with us and, therefore, we don't really need to articulate
the full range of reasons. If we're talking about certain practices,
the burden of proof lies upon others and the reflection, well, reasons
are hard to articulate, and you are wonderful on that subject in
the discussion of cloning, but as a matter of fact, an awful lot
of articulation did develop.
And I think Michael is suggesting that that comfortable kind of
articulation would be appropriate on the subject of the question
of the boundaries between the human and the animal.
Another question is whether this division of principles, on the
one hand, that we all agree with and then a few illustrations doesn't
clear out the whole question whether the principles are so generally
stated that an awful lot of legislative mischief could walk through
the door opened wide by the principles.
And even if you give an illustration on something that you mean
by the principle, you haven't sufficiently carefully described
the general principle in such a way that you either make it so general
that nobody is persuaded to do anything legislatively—that was
Jim's point—or it's stated so generally that too much
can walk through that door that if not all of us, an awful lot of
us might not want to see.
Because, after all, legislators looking at a document that we
produce can look at the principles, ignore the illustration, and
they've got that principle that they can invoke, and what kind
of real counsel have we offered?
Those are some of my concerns.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Let's see. I have hands
from Michael, Gil.
PROF. SANDEL: I think that the general problem
being discussed is whether the principles or especially the examples,
though they might well generate consensus, haven't fully been
considered, and if that's a weighty worry, it doesn't argue
for scrapping this part of the project. In some of the cases it
argues simply for devoting a session or two so that we can articulate.
Now, you invoke the wisdom of repugnance in the transgenic case.
Well, maybe we can't, you know, articulate reasons for not wanting
to put the human embryo in a pig uterus.
On the other hand, the wisdom of repugnance was invoked or could
have been invoked also on reproductive cloning, and yet we did pretty
well in articulating reasons for our instinctive, gut opposition
to cloning to make babies. We got quite a far way,
And our mission of contributing to public discourse was better
served by that than if we had simply said, "Well, look. If
you don't see what's wrong with cloning to produce babies,
there's something wrong with you."
Likewise here, we might be able actually to make a contribution
in articulating the reasons for the widespread repugnance that we
presumably share to mix animal and human things or beings.
But it really wasn't the animal and human. That's one
issue, the question of what we haven't fully considered and
how we might. I mean, that's an important discussion, but there
is one thing in here that reflects the opposite problem, something
that we have very fully considered and that nonetheless in a document
intended to reflect consensus is something that reflects one of
the deepest divisions we had after six months of discussion, and
that's on page 15, the last sentence of the first paragraph,
where we are suggesting as an illustration that Congress include
a moratorium on creating human embryos solely for the purpose of
research, which would encompass a ban on cloning for biomedical
And we voted ten to seven here. So we know there's no consensus.
This is the case where it was fully considered and where we know
there's not a consensus. So why include that in a document
that is intended to reflect consensus?
CHAIRMAN KASS: It should go.
Leaving the last point off, the other is an invitation to what
exactly? To drafting—
PROF. SANDEL: Not to give up on this. I don't
think we should give up on this project or even on the idea of having
specific suggestions about what Congress should consider, but I
know it's a problem of the timetable.
And I don't know whether this body will be renewed or not,
but it seems to me worthwhile since we've gotten this far, and
the regulatory project is a worthy and important project for all
of the reasons that you've stated and others. I think that
if we actually devoted sessions to some of these paragraphs, we
could probably achieve consensus and produce a regulatory report
of this kind.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Gil is in the queue, but shall
we spend some of the time we have here on one of these sample points
to see where we can go?
Gil, did you want to comment before we—I mean, the purpose of
this was, in part, to float the idea, but also to concretely speak
about the particular items that are here.
Some I thought would disappear. Some I thought would simply disappear.
I think that the argument about surrogacy is likely to disappear
for reasons that have already been alluded to, but there is at least
a question as to whether that as a commercial venture is somehow
compatible. I put it down there because some people have indicated
they would like it discussed, but I knew that it would be controversial.
But, Gil, why don't you go ahead?
PROF. MEILAENDER: One hardly knows what to
say at this point. I'm not really sure what I think about
how we ought to proceed. I'd say just a couple of things.
I agree with a part of Michael's last point that we shouldn't
do anything here that asks people, as it were, to retract a position
that they arrived at after a long period of months of discussion
that eventuated in our cloning report. That just isn't the
sort of thing that we should do, I believe.
The question is whether there is something that we can do without
an enormous amount of time devoted to it. The attraction of it
is this. I mean I myself could affirm many if perhaps not all of
the things in the paragraph spell out and specify the principles,
but you wouldn't need all of them to accomplish something that
had a certain kind of symbolic result.
That is to say if you think of the way Leon couched the effort,
we are thinking of a document that outlines what's going on
that presents findings about it that suggests recommendations for
various ways that more information that is needed could be gathered.
And then the question would be: can one just even symbolically
have a way of saying an individual should not simply forge ahead
without thinking about the larger public goods that are involved.
You wouldn't need all of this to carry that symbolic freight.
You would need something probably.
Now, maybe we can just get along without the symbolic message
entirely. I don't know, but the advantage of something like
this, even if a scaled down version that doesn't have everything,
is that it does carry a certain kind of message that this report
that we're contemplating probably could not carry without it.
I mean that, I think, is what we need to think about here, and I
don't know if I have anything better than that to say about
CHAIRMAN KASS: Robby.
PROF. GEORGE: Leon, just a question of clarification.
Was the idea that what we're looking for here is necessarily
consensus, that we would only go forward with a recommendation if
all members of the Council agreed to it so that each of us would
have a veto over every possible recommendation?
I mean that seems to have crept into the discussion, and it wasn't
my understanding at the beginning. I mean I can see the value of
that. I can see why it would be useful to get as much agreement
as possible, and we certainly want to avoid division to the extent
possible, but I just wondered if that was the understanding or even
if that was the staff's understanding in preparing the document.
CHAIRMAN KASS: I think the understanding was
to see if we could find consensus on specifics, yes. If we can't,
there would be a kind of reconsideration, and to find consensus
on specifics that are not the least common denominator.
Because we have set aside—I'll be corrected if I don't
Despite the continued differences about the status of the embryo,
we are looking to agree on certain kinds of policy suggestions that
as it states here should command not just the respect of the assent
of people, but sense and will, et cetera.
And in this particular part, let me read from the working paper.
"In Section III, we identify for Council discussion several
aspects of the dignity of human procreation that may warrant interim,"
interim, "prudent legislative action, especially in light of
rapidly arriving innovations that signal new departures in human
reproduction. Familiar disquiet regarding human cloning or commerce
in human embryos and gametes is augmented by recent reports of fusion
of male and female embryos into one chimerical organism or the derivation
of gametes from embryonic stem cells, in principle enabling embryos
to become biological parents.
"Accordingly, while the policy makers monitor and gather
information and while deliberation continues in search of better
and more permanent monitoring and oversight arrangements, it may
be necessary and desirable to enact interim prophylactic limitations
which would prevent individuals acting on their own from introducing
major innovations into human procreation in the absence of full
public discussion and deliberation about their ethical and social
implications and consequences."
That's the spirit, and it does, I think, have something of
the symbolic character to articulate these are the things we care
about. It would be better if we could say why we care about them.
I agree with Michael fully on that. That would be helpful, but
that certain kinds of markers or boundaries are sort of set down
as an indication of an expression of the concern in this time where
in the absence of such one is going to be faced with facts on the
ground in the absence of any kind of public discussion.
I think there was—Frank, was it you and then Mike? Mike.
DR. GAZZANIGA: Well, I think the concern here
is that this document comes off as argument by freak show, and one
can always—freak show? I mean the extreme cases that seemingly
And the concern is that the scientific enterprise will be seriously
impacted because of subtleties that we're just not thinking
about; that people would read into the freak show principles or
reasons why you can't do something straightforward.
So the issue that Paul raised about the Chinese work of the rabbit
oocyte and the somatic cell nuclear transfer opportunity. I mean,
if you just look at that as a—the rabbit oocyte is a value chemical
(phonetic). So that's what's going on there. Now you're
just taking advantage of it.
One interpretation on one of these readings might be that that
would be precluded as an option. That would be a terrible thing.
So we're not going to get around the concern today that a
serious scientific exploration of the implication of a freak show
argument, what they might be. We have to sit down and go through
that in a very careful way, and I don't think anybody is prepared
to make those kinds of decisions today. I'm certainly not.
And then finally, I'd just like to observe that all of this
is admittedly sort of throttling down things, and one might say
at the end of this two-year process the science that's gone
on and what we heard yesterday, that one may want to throttle some
things up; that, in fact, we heard rather dramatic information yesterday
from the Parkinson's people about what they're achieving.
So, you know, I don't know why we don't have a Section
IV, you know. Here are the opportunities that have unfolded. Here
are the promises. Maybe we should be changing our recommendations
and Congress should be, too, making a stronger case for what ten
of us actually voted for, which we had no ethical problem with biomedical
CHAIRMAN KASS: Dan, is that a hand?
DR. FOSTER: Well, I know that you don't
want—I mean, every time I say that I know what you want—
CHAIRMAN KASS: Go ahead. Go ahead.
DR. FOSTER: No, I'm not going to say it.
DR. FOSTER: I'm not going to say that again,
and he reminded me last night he still hasn't told me what he
It seems to me that a consideration of—you know, if we're
coming up to the end of the Council, I think that one symbolic thing
that you want to say after all of the study and so forth that we,
probably most of us, have become more aware of the serious problems
that may confront human beings that are worthy of elevating the
goal of what it means to be a human being. So that if we were to
close today, you've got the regulations on the first two parts
of this that we sort of went through pretty clearly without much
major objection to.
And then it seems to me that this number three is sort of an epilogue
which says we want to begin to remind of what we started with, that
the human animal is a special and very wonderful animal that we
as humans need to take care of.
And so, you know, the principles are in one sense principles of,
you know, I'm not against motherhood or against God. I think
we ought to do these things.
But, on the other hand, if it's likely that there is to be
an extension of the Council, I think a number of persons have said,
and I think I find myself agreeing with this, that this would be -
some of the things that have been discussed in this issue would
be very important things to complement what we've already done.
In one sense I've thought, well, why should we extend the
Council. I mean, the main thing was the cloning and so forth and
so on. But it might be that this really is a worthy project after
which one could have a more—I think what I've heard other
people say—a much more powerful way of saying that our concern
for the sanctity of the human being, which I think not one of us
around this table would wish to deny; I certainly think that my
own concern for the human being, although I think it has always
been profound, has been enhanced by listening to the learning things
So that if the likelihood is—and you would maybe know more than
any of us would about an extension—is true, then this would seem
to me to be a very worthy project, which I don't know what the
October-November meetings are going to be on, but which we should
entertain, and then the symbolic value would be enhanced by certain
things that we would probably all agree with.
I think there are intuitive truths, you know, that all humans
have, and some of these things would do that. So I think that my
own view would be that if it's likely that we're going to
extend it, that we ought to take this as a very serious thing.
Some of the things that some of us have talked about, international
bioethics and the treatment of disease and things of that sort might
not be as directly under here.
So I think that I would join with those who say that we need an
epilogue if this is over, and we might come to some general consensus
and then give a boundary statement or two saying that, for example,
one might do this, without giving any details.
But I think it would be a very worthy project to go forward and
one which we would all learn something, and if we learn something,
then our conscience statements for the nation—maybe that's
grandiose to say we're the conscience of the nation—but if
there's some element of that, it would be much more powerful,
and I think it would avoid the sort of hurried sense here that if
we're coming to the end, we want to have an epilogue, but if
we're not coming to the end, we can make the epilogue stronger
and more powerful after further discussion.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Thank you.
Bill Hurlbut and then Michael.
DR. HURLBUT: I feel that what we've written,
what has been written here maybe with some of the specifics shaped
a little differently is perfectly appropriate for the document as
it stands and a very good thing to do, whether or not these issues
are taken up by us in the future. I think we're flagging certain
important territories that we were supposed to educate the public
to. We have set them out here.
I think every one of these territories is important. I didn't
mean in raising the issue of the complexity of the chimeric hybrid
creatures to deflect this. I think this is a very good thing, appropriate
for the document, and there's no reason not to do it.
But to just put an exclamation point behind what Dan just said,
I think that one of the values of including this is that it's
an acknowledgement that we're at the convergence of technologies,
and we're at a very historic moment in the unfolding of science.
When genetics started to produce the kind of ethical problems
that it has, there wasn't an assembled structure for speaking
about it in place. Now, at the equivalent beginning of the era
of developmental biology, we have an opportunity to step in and
actually make some prospective judgments and some real influence
on how this unfolds before it unfolds out of control.
And I think that whereas it may be very hard to do things that
have major impact through genetics, I don't think it will be
with developmental biology. I think we're looking at some very,
very serious ethical concerns here, and we should have something
like this in our document, and we should for us or others make it
plain that there are important ethical territories here that need
to be on the radar for the general society.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Michael.
PROF. SANDEL: Well, I have a concrete suggestion
though, first, just to respond to Robby's point. It was Leon
who laid down the hope and the expectation and the aim that this
could be a consensus report rather than one with voting with majority
and minority, though I think Robby raises a good question, and it
might be better to have it, if we're really going to delve into
these areas. I think that should be an open question, but that
was the assumption that Leon laid and the hope that Leon laid before
But I think that would be worth rethinking for the reasons that
Robby suggested, but as for a concrete suggestion on how to proceed,
there are really three substantive areas that are covered by these
paragraphs. One of them has to do with the transgenic, the human
animal, and that's essentially this paragraph on the bottom
of page 13.
The other area has to do with patenting and commodification.
That includes the middle paragraph on page 15 and the last sentence
of the first paragraph on page 14 about surrogacy.
Now, we've had in the case of the transgenic and human animal,
we've had no sessions. In the case of the patenting, we have
had some sessions, though not on the surrogacy and not on the last
sentence of the patenting paragraph. We haven't really discussed,
and I was surprised to see here as a conclusion that the law should
be careful to clarify that human genes should be eligible for patents.
I don't think we really have discussed whether human genes
should be eligible for patents. My own not fully worked out view
is that they probably shouldn't be, but in any case, that seems
to me a discussion that would be worth having under the heading
But in any case, that's a second substantive area, and the
third area is represented by the middle paragraphs having to do
with ART and the embryo and genetic technologies, which we have
So one way of trying to try to do this, but to do it well, in
a considered way, would be, depending on what the agenda is for
the next meeting, and there may be competing things that we need
to cover, to have one or two sessions with readings and so on on
the transgenic question, what counts as a hybrid, what are the experiments
putting, you know, human cells into mouse brains, embryo brains
or whatever. What are some of the philosophical arguments about
the line between the human and the animal?
Have a couple of sessions on that with readings and discussion.
Then have another couple of sessions building on our patent, but
broadening it to the commodification issues. Should genes be patented?
If you want you could include surrogacy in a discussion of that
there, and then that would just leave for really as a drafting question,
since we've discussed a lot about ART and the genetic, reprogenetics
as some people call it, and the embryos. That we have discussed.
So there it's really a question of responding to drafting and
And then we would be in a position to maybe go ahead with something
like this, but perhaps we don't have enough time in the October
meeting to take this up.
CHAIRMAN KASS: I think we will have to obviously
digest what goes on here to sort of figure out the suggestion, the
program for October. I'm not sure I share exactly your analysis.
The way you've parsed this is certainly, I think, one way that
it could be parsed, but the remarks on the patenting of embryos—the last sentence, I admit, has not been discussed, and if I had
been on my toes, that would have been to say that this recommendation
has not yet settled the question about the other. In other words,
we meant to be something pertinent to the embryo, period.
So this wasn't really an instance under the large subject
of commodification, but an instance under the respect for the early
stages of nascent life.
And I think the question about the human-animal boundary in general
and the implications there would be a very rich thing to discuss,
and there have been meetings on it and reported in the New York
Times and others, and if we continue, that would be a topic
at least worth putting on the agenda.
The question is whether there is a tiny piece of it that belongs
under the heading of the dignity appropriation rather than—and
maybe it doesn't belong.
PROF. DRESSER: One other small, concrete suggestion
would be to make a list of the specifics that you want to retain
and then float it with some scientific organizations and ASRM, and
just say, to avoid this problem of having unintended consequences,
"Are there any concerns or things we should think about if
we were to recommend some moratorium or something against these?
What would be covered? Are there any problems that you see?"
And see what they say, you know, to a small group just to inform
ourselves in an efficient way.
CHAIRMAN KASS: I think—Bill, is that light
on for a reason?
DR. MAY: No.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Sorry. I thought you wanted
to speak. You can speak if you'd like.
I think while we could spend time discussing any of the particular
items, I think it would, in the light of the larger questions about
the enterprise and its shape be time not well spent today.
I think I've taken the temperature of the room. We will digest
the multiple comments, and this will be an agenda item in some for
or other in October, unless you hear otherwise.
We've got a lot. There are a lot of things sort of coming
together here in these last few months. So the exact agenda for
October we have to work out, but I wouldn't dare summarize what
I think I've heard here because I'd have to read it, but
I thank you for the serious attentions both to form and content,
and this will not be abandoned. It will be brought to the next
stage for discussion.
PROF. WILSON: If I may suggest in the interest
of economy and the best use of the Council's time, let us minimize
to the greatest extent possible external testimony. We have enough
to talk about among ourselves, and we can read—
CHAIRMAN KASS: We have no plans for further
PROF. WILSON: That's splendid.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Yeah, we've got lots to
And actually, the people around the table who have spoken about
the importance of trying to develop language to articulate these
intuitions, this is one of the occasions because staff has a lot
else to do; this is one of those occasions where the proposal to
bell the cat carries with it the obligation to do so.
So I'll call on Michael and perhaps Bill to give us some kind
of paragraphs maybe that we can actually put before people in addition
to just the bare intuitions. We can talk. We'll sort it out.
PROF. FUKUYAMA: I've been trying to formulate
this. I'm not sure I'll get it quite right, but I actually
wouldn't shy away from the freak show side of this just for
the following reason. I can guarantee, Mike, that if we continue
down today to a list of things that you think are freakish, in ten
years, you know, if these things enter into clinical practice you'll
probably be saying, "Well, you know, what's wrong?"
And since the technology has proceeded as quickly as it has, there
are a lot of things that people thought were freakish, you know,
20 years ago that have entered into practice, and I think it's
not a bad idea to lay down, you know, a series of markers about
things that we think are, you know, highly troubling even if they
don't seem to be, you know, immediately possible but that, you
know, could become possible in the next few years because, you know,
I think precisely for the reason you said earlier, Leon; that if
you don't lay down such a marker, then when it happens, people
are going to say, "Well, nobody objected to this," or,
"nobody said anything about this. So what can we have against
And I think that actually politically if you think about what
really motivates people to worry about this stuff, it is these possibilities.
So I think that you don't want to dance around that too much
by formulating very general principles, you know, without connecting
them to, I think, some real technological possibilities that we
will be, you know, in all likelihood confronting.
CHAIRMAN KASS: Also on the one item, by the
way, that never got any discussion, there is a very interesting
proposal under the heading of the respect for the early stages of
days of human life on the prohibition of use and research or the
preservation for purpose of conducting research on an embryo past
the tenth day, as it now states here. That's not futuristic.
That's not futuristic.
And I would invite especially the scientific members of the panel.
I mean, it's always possible to say that there are many things
that you lay down as restrictions that are going to get in the way
of basic research, and you could probably find some good justification
for even some of these freakish things if some benefit could be
But the question is: how is the public to take seriously the
moral responsibility and conscience of scientists themselves if
they aren't somehow willing to join in a collective body to
try to hammer out those things that all of us as human beings—the things we don't agree on, fine, but to in a way, to make
the extra effort to see if we can't for the time being and as
interim measures only set down some of these markers that we could
endorse whether we're scientists or not, whether we're pro
lifers or not, but because we care about these kinds of things.
Now, it's important to do it right. I have no doubt about
that, and I think we'll give it a try.
There are no people signed up for public comment.
The people who have to leave at 11:30 have five minutes.
Thank you all. We'll be in touch.
(Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the meeting in the above-entitled
matter was concluded.)