Reproduction and Responsibility:
The Regulation of New Biotechnologies
The President's Council on Bioethics
Washington, D.C.
March 2004 www.bioethics.gov
Chapter Four
Modification of Traits and Characteristics
Advances in molecular biology and increases in genomic knowledge
have begun to raise the possibility that scientists may one day be able
not merely to screen and select embryos (or gametes) for particular
traits and characteristics, but also to modify and engineer them.
Should this capacity arrive, it would greatly increase our control over
the genetic make-up of future generations and alter the relationships
between parents and their engineered children. Such a capacity could,
in principle be used both to treat genetic abnormalities and to try to
engineer desired enhancements.
For now, and for the foreseeable future, such a prospect is purely
speculative. The following chapter attempts to assess the state of
the science in this area, as well as the ethical, social, and
regulatory questions such a capacity would present to us, if it ever
came to be.
I. Techniques and Practices
Currently, genetic modification of human embryos is purely hypothetical.
There seem to be two techniques with the potential—not yet realized—to
make this possibility a reality. The first would be the direct
genetic modification of developing embryos through gene-transfer
(insertion of genetic material in cells to repair or replace
defective genes, to add new genetic information, or to regulate
expression of resident genes). The second would indirectly achieve
and would amount to the prospective genetic modification of
an embryo (not yet conceived) by changing the genes in the progenitor’s
gametes. Both are discussed below.
Gene-transfer is the process by which a DNA sequence containing
a functional gene (or part of a gene or another regulatory genetic
element) is inserted into cells, resulting in the expression (or
silencing) of a gene product. This transfer is achieved by means
of a “vector”—usually a modified virus that penetrates the targeted
cells and introduces the new genetic information in a stable way.
There are two broad categories of gene-transfer, defined according
to which cells are modified. “Somatic gene-transfer” is the delivery
of genes (or other genetic elements) to the differentiated cells
of the body (or even totipotent stem cells). Here the effects of
genetic modification are limited to the individual who receives
the new DNA sequence. By contrast “germ-line gene-transfer” refers
to a delivery of genes that affect the reproductive cells, thus
causing a genetic modification that is heritable.i
Somatic gene-transfer for humans is now being developed for therapeutic
purposes (“gene-therapy”), in an effort to correct genetic abnormalities
or cure genetic diseases.ii
The first such effort was undertaken by researchers at the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990 to treat patients with severe
combined immunodeficiency syndrome (SCIDS).1
Currently, there are more than 500 gene-transfer research protocols
under development,2
all of them limited to genetic modification of somatic cells. While
some people have suggested that germ-line gene-transfer might be
a useful means of preventing the transmission of genetic abnormalities
to offspring, there are currently no protocols for such treatment
in humans.
Several experimental methods of germ-line modification are, however,
being studied in animals, and not only for the treatment of genetic
disease. One method, using mouse embryos, employs gene-transfer
into the fertilized ovum. This has the effect of modifying all of
the cells of the developing embryo, including the reproductive cells.
In research to date, the resulting offspring expressed the new genetic
information in variable ways—many of which have resulted in harmful
abnormalities.3
Those offspring that express the new genetic materials in the desired
manner are bred to produce a line of mice containing the new genetic
characteristic. This approach has succeeded also in primates.4
An alternative method, currently in the very early stages of development,
effects inheritable genetic modification by inserting an artificial
chromosome that carries new genetic information into the reproductive
cells of the recipient animal.5
Two principal obstacles to the safe and effective use of gene-transfer
(in children or adults) are the difficulty of controlling, first,
the exact locations in the host DNA into which new genetic information
is inserted and, second, the extent to which the new genes are expressed
in the right cells at the correct developmental time (without inducing
other unwanted gene expression or altered regulation of resident
genes). Unintended and unforeseen genetic expression has been responsible
for the development of leukemia in children participating in clinical
trials investigating gene-transfer for SCIDS.iii
6 These difficulties
would likely worsen in attempts to modify the germ-line. The practitioner
must contend not only with difficulties of placement and function
of the new gene in the recipient, he must also try to anticipate
and control these effects for the future generations who will inherit
the genetic change. It would be difficult to study this approach
in a scientifically rigorous way, given that the full results might
not be known for decades. For these reasons, deliberate germ-line
gene-transfer in human beings is risky, and unintentional germ-line
modification is a danger to be avoided.
The problem of controlling placement and gene expression might perhaps
be greater in the hypothetical case of genetic modification of embryos.
There are now no effective means of ensuring the appropriate
distribution, levels, or timing of expression of an inserted gene in an
embryo. The risks of germ-line gene modification in this context would
be profound.
II. Ethical Considerations
Many of the ethical concerns raised by the potential new capacities
to modify and engineer specific traits or characteristics in
developing human beings are much the same as those discussed
in Chapter 3. They relate to effects on procreation and family,
attitudes toward children, possible effects on human capacities,
and potential new types of inequality. However, this new ability
would bring with it certain unique concerns and augment some
concerns previously discussed. These special problems are discussed
briefly below—both those connected to the safety of these techniques,
and the ethical and social concerns that such technologies might
raise if direct genetic modification were one day to become
possible.
A. Safety of Embryonic Genetic Modification
There are today no safe and effective means of genetic modification
of early embryos. For reasons described above, the effects of
direct gene-transfer into an embryo are unpredictable—there
is no reliable way to control the insertion, function, and heritability
of the new genetic information.v
There is no reliable way to guarantee that the gene will express
itself in the intended way or to prevent the gene from expressing
itself (or triggering other genetic expressions) in an adverse
manner. Prospective genetic modification of offspring by germ-line
gene-transfer to the gonads of the parents (or to isolated ovum
and sperm) is equally, if not more, problematic, given that
the effects of the gene insertion are even more attenuated (by
the vagaries of sexual recombination) and thus less controllable.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that harms resulting
from germ-line gene modification may not be apparent for generations.
There is widespread agreement in the scientific community that
genetic modification of human embryos or gametes, with the intent
of producing a child, is not now safe or ethical.
B. Sources of Disquiet Regarding Genetic
Modification
The possible creation of children with specific and deliberately chosen
genetic characteristics—at present wholly speculative—raises many of
the same ethical concerns as genetic screening and selection, but is
distinct in some noteworthy respects. A child who is designed to
certain specifications might be viewed as more of an artifact—or more
answerable to the will of his or her parents—than a child who is merely
selected for his or her existing characteristics. In this way,
genetic modification of developing human beings, should it become
feasible, might have even broader and more significant consequences:
turning procreation into a form of manufacture; promoting a new
eugenics, where parents and society seek only the “best” children;
allowing individuals or society to alter the native human capacities of
offspring in a direct way, and perhaps to engineer novel capacities not
hitherto present in human beings; and binding the next generation to a
genetic fate that suits the will of the present one.
It bears repeating that “designer babies” and “super babies”
are not at all likely in the foreseeable future, and that
even the introduction into embryos of any specific genes,
with the aim of particular modest improvements, is not now
feasible or safe. At present, therefore, these broader ethical
and social concerns are wholly speculative.v
III. Current Regulation
There is currently no regulation specifically governing
attempts at genetic modification of gametes or early embryos.
Yet the extensive federal regulations on gene-transfer research—undertaken
for the purpose of gene-therapy of existing individuals—are
broad enough to cover any such activities. There is no state
regulation of genetic modification. There have been instances
of individuals using tort litigation as a means of bringing
regulatory pressure to bear on the practice of genetic modification,
but this is relatively new.
A. Federal Regulation of Gene-Transfer Research
There are two principal sources of federal oversight and regulation
of gene-transfer research: NIH and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The long and complicated history of the roles played
by these institutions in the regulation of gene-transfer research
need not be recited here, but the result of that history is
that FDA has chief responsibility for ensuring that not only
all gene-transfer products but also all gene-transfer research
protocols are safe and effective. NIH, by contrast, provides
more limited oversight through its Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee (RAC). The RAC considers the ethical implications
of—and offers advice to the NIH director about—novel gene-transfer
research protocols that have some funding connection with NIH.
1. FDA Oversight.
No gene-therapy products are currently approved for general use
in human beings. Accordingly, any transfer to a human subject of
products that introduce genetic material into the body to replace
faulty or missing genetic material (or to alter the regulation of
resident genes) for the treatment or cure of disease constitutes
a gene-transfer clinical trial, requiring prior submission of an
investigational new drug (IND) application to the FDA.vi
“Gene-therapy products” include biologically based articles, such
as a subject’s own cells that have been extracted and modified outside
the body prior to re-transfer into the human subject, or articles
(natural or synthetic) that are directly transferred to the human
subject with the intention of genetically altering his or her cells.
The FDA has asserted authority over gene-transfer technologies,
regarding them as a type of drug or biologic, under the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and Public Health Service Act
(PHSA). The FDA claimed this authority as early as 1984, when it
issued a policy statement noting that “nucleic acids used for human
gene-transfer research trials will be subject to the same requirements
as other biological drugs.”7
Since that time, the FDA has provided guidance to the research community
through a series of informational publications. One such guidance
document, issued in 1998, gave comprehensive direction regarding
technical and safety requirements.8
It included advice on matters such as preclinical safety data, molecular
sequence of gene vectors, characterization of cell lines used in
vectors, and the long-term monitoring of the health of human subjects.9
The most comprehensive articulation of FDA’s legal authority to
regulate in this area came in the form of a Federal Register
notice in 1993.10
It defined gene-therapy products as those articles that “contain
genetic materials administered to modify or manipulate the expression
of genetic material or to alter the biological properties of living
cells.”11
Such products are subject to the licensing, false labeling, and
misbranding provisions for biologics (under PHSA12)
and drugs (under the FDCA).vii
In the case of gene-transfer, the product in question will fall
into one or both categories, depending on whether it is of synthetic
or biological origin. The biological products that are the source
materials for gene-transfer are also subject to the aforementioned
licensing requirements. The FDA additionally claims jurisdiction
to regulate gene-therapy products pursuant to its authority to prevent
the interstate spread of communicable disease under Section 361
of the PHSA.
Because gene-therapy products are regarded as biologics or drugs
or both, manufacturers and developers of gene therapies who wish
to introduce technologies for general use must apply for premarket
approval in the form of biologics license applications (BLAs), in
the cases of biologics, or new drug applications (NDAs), in the
cases of drugs.13
To qualify for such licenses, manufacturers of gene-therapy products
must provide the FDA with voluminous information. In addition, the
FDA requires such manufacturers to test the gene-therapy products
in human subjects in clinical trials, which may be initiated only
after the issuance of an IND. An IND requires the sponsor to explain
to the FDA the nature of the study, the risks to the human subjects,
the relevant human-subject protections in place (including institutional
review board [IRB] approval), and the data supporting the study.14
As discussed in Chapter 2, the FDA has, on one occasion, prominently
exercised its authority over gene-therapy products in the context of
assisted reproduction. Upon learning of the efforts of clinicians at
St. Barnabas Hospital in Livingston, New Jersey, to perform ooplasm
transfer, the FDA asserted its authority on the grounds that such
activities constituted unauthorized clinical trials in gene-transfer.
Thus, the FDA informed St. Barnabas that it must halt all such activity
and submit an IND before proceeding further.
Since the death in 1999 of Jesse Gelsinger, a young man participating
in a gene-transfer clinical trial for treatment of ornithine
transcarbamylase deficiency (OTC), FDA has increased its oversight of
gene-transfer trials. It has instituted the “Gene Therapy Trial
Monitoring Program,” whereby sponsors of clinical trials are required
to designate independent monitors who are supervised by the FDA.
Additionally, the FDA issued a “Dear Sponsor” letter to all IND
sponsors requesting that they include detailed information in their IND
applications regarding products used in the manufacture and testing of
gene-therapy products and evidence of quality-control mechanisms.
Additionally, FDA officially promised to advise NIH’s Office of
Biotechnology Activities (the parent office of the RAC) of any
alterations in gene-transfer research protocols. In January 2003, the
FDA ordered a temporary halt to all gene-transfer research trials using
retroviral vectors and blood stem cells.
As of 2000, FDA was overseeing more than 200 gene-transfer
research clinical trials.15
None involve germ-line gene modification, which in the FDA’s
view cannot now be undertaken in a manner safe and effective
enough to satisfy the IND requirement. Indeed, any gene-transfer
research protocol that carries a serious risk even of inadvertent
germ-line modification is unlikely to meet IND requirements.
From a legal perspective, however, the proscription of germ-line
modification does not exist for the benefit of the
unconceived embryo, since the FDA has no clear legal authority
to consider the safety of future generations. Rather, the
FDA’s justification for treating germ-line therapy with such
caution is framed in terms of safety, efficacy, and the protection
of human subjects in clinical trials (not including the embryos,
who are not considered legal subjects).viii
2. NIH/RAC Oversight.
NIH is a “major funder of human gene-transfer research and the
basic science that underpins it.”16
As such, it shares with FDA some responsibility for oversight of
gene-transfer research. Any project funded by NIH, or conducted
at an institution that receives NIH funding, is subject to NIH review.
NIH also accepts and reviews protocols from researchers who voluntarily
submit them, regardless of the funding source. The approval process
itself considers the ethical, scientific, and safety dimensions
of each protocol. The document that governs this process is the
“NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules,”
which provides the standards researchers must meet to ensure safety
and safe handling of the articles used and derived in such research.
The NIH Guidelines additionally provide the requirements for institutional
oversight by the Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBC) and the
RAC. The NIH Guidelines also provide extensive guidance to researchers
on the standards and procedures for the conduct of their clinical
trials.17
Researchers submit their materials to NIH’s Office of Biotechnology
Affairs (OBA). These materials include a cover letter that, among other
things, identifies the IBCs and IRB at the proposed clinical trial site
and acknowledges that no research participant will be enrolled until
RAC review is complete and IBC, IRB, and other regulatory approvals
have been obtained; a scientific abstract; non-technical abstract; the
proposed clinical protocol, including tables, figures, and relevant
manuscripts; the proposed informed consent forms; and the curriculum
vitae of the principal investigator. Additionally, researchers must
respond to a series of questions listed in the NIH Guidelines about the
objective and rationale of the proposed project, and questions relating
to informed consent and privacy (this is commonly referred to as
“Appendix M”). An important characteristic of NIH oversight is that the
materials submitted to OBA are generally considered to be in the public
domain. This is a key difference from the FDA, which by law must
safeguard proprietary information from public access.
Once it has received the aforementioned information, OBA forwards
the application for preliminary consideration by the RAC. The RAC
is a panel of experts—including scientists, physicians, lawyers,
ethicists, and laypersons—that advises the NIH director and the
OBA on recombinant DNA research. In addition to reviewing specific
research proposals involving gene-transfer, the RAC recommends changes
to the NIH Guidelines. While the RAC has no formal authority to
accept or reject research proposals, submission to the RAC is a
compulsory aspect of the NIH review process. Thus, the RAC’s current
refusal to “entertain proposals for germ-line alterations”18
effectively ensures that no such protocols will receive NIH funding.
Following its review of a given proposal, the RAC determines whether
the protocol “raises important scientific, safety, medical, ethical,
or social issues that warrant in-depth discussion at the RAC’s quarterly
public meeting.”19
Any protocols that present “unique applications of gene transfer
research, the use of new or otherwise salient vector or gene delivery
systems, special clinical concerns, or important social or ethical
issues”20
are singled out for further review and public discussion.
If the RAC selects a protocol for further review, the researcher must
make a brief presentation at a RAC meeting and take questions about the
protocol from RAC members and, possibly, outside experts. This process
is open to the public. Following the presentation, the RAC makes a
recommendation to the NIH director and the OBA regarding things that
the researcher “should carefully consider . . . as part of
optimizing the safe and ethical conduct of the trial.” The
recommendations are memorialized in a letter that is sent to the
researcher, the institutional IRB and IBC overseeing the protocol, and
the FDA.
Within twenty days of enrolling and obtaining consent from the
first research subject, the researcher must submit to the OBA a
number of items, including a copy of the informed consent form approved
by the IRB, a copy of the protocol approved by the IBC and IRB,
a copy of final IBC approval from the clinical trial site, a copy
of final IRB approval, the applicable NIH grant numbers, the FDA
IND number, and the date of the initiation of the trial. Additionally,
the researcher must provide a “brief written report that includes
. . . (1) how the investigator(s) responded to each of the
RAC’s recommendations on the protocol (if applicable); and (2) any
modifications to the protocol as required by FDA.”21
During the course of the clinical trial, researchers have an ongoing
obligation to inform OBA, the IRBs, IBCs, FDA, and the sponsoring
NIH institutions within fifteen days of serious unexpected adverse
events that might be associated with the gene-transfer project.
If such adverse events involve death or risk of death, this must
be reported within seven days. Additionally, researchers must provide
OBA with an annual report.
B. Tort Litigation as a Regulatory Mechanism
In addition to the federal system of oversight described above,
individuals have recently begun to use tort litigation as a way to
regulate those engaged in gene-transfer research. Because there have
been no instances of human embryonic gene-transfer, there are no
decisional authorities that address the viability of a claim on behalf
of a person for harm done in the course of such a protocol. Still, it
may be useful briefly to discuss the extant decisional authority
bearing on legal claims available to an individual harmed during a
clinical trial.
Claimants in clinical-trial cases have sued researchers for negligence
in the conduct of the clinical trial. Such a claim requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the researcher owed a duty of care
to the subject, which he breached, resulting in cognizable injury.
The question of whether a duty is owed by a researcher in this context
has been the subject of some debate. Most courts that have considered
the issue have found that a duty exists, by virtue of the special
relationship between researcher and subject, the quasi-contract
formed by the informed-consent agreement, or implied by the federal
guidelines for human-subject protections. The standard of care owed
under these circumstances—a question analytically separate from
whether a duty exists—has also been the subject of some discussion.
Most courts addressing the question have held that the standards
for informed consent set forth by the Common Rule and FDA’s human-subject
protections constitute the relevant standard of care, the breach
of which may be considered actionable. Two courts have gone farther:
one holding that the researcher must disclose any conflicts of interest,22
and another holding that parents are legally incapable of subjecting
their children to any risks in nontherapeutic research.ix
23 In addition
to the standards for informed consent in the federal guidelines,
some commentators have suggested that courts should import medical
malpractice jurisprudence to determine the standard of care. They
argue that the researcher owes the subject “implementation of knowledge,
skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the
profession in good standing.”24
Deviation from this standard, under this analysis, would constitute
actionable breach. Claimants could prove the contours of this standard
of care through the introduction of extrinsic evidence at trial,
as through expert witness testimony. This might be problematic in
the gene-transfer context; it is such a new technique that “custom”
might be hard to establish.
To recover, the claimant must also demonstrate that the researcher’s
breach caused the relevant injury. Again, this might be difficult
for gene-transfer research, given the complexity and novelty of
the procedure. Moreover, even if the claimant could show that, but
for the researcher’s conduct, the harm would not have occurred,
the court may not be willing, on grounds of public policy, to impose
liability. Courts have sometimes been hesitant to impose such liability
on researchers for fear that to do so would have a chilling effect
on scientific experimentation that is socially beneficial.25
Proving harm might also be very difficult in the context of gene-transfer
research, particularly when the individual harmed is unborn when
the harm occurs or, as in the case of germ-line gene-transfer, unconceived.
Courts have been hesitant to impose liability on harm to future
generations.26
In addition to negligence claims, individuals can bring
actions for assault and battery on the theory that their informed
consent was defective or not meaningful.
C. Nongovernmental Regulation
Various professional societies have issued statements offering
guidance and reflection on the ethics of genetic engineering and
gene-transfer. For example, the American Medical Association (AMA)
has issued ethics opinions on each of these subjects. The AMA’s
statement on genetic engineering makes it clear that if and when
this practice becomes ready for clinical application, the AMA standards
on clinical investigation, medical practice, and informed consent
apply. Moreover, the AMA holds the following: genetic engineering
should be conducted safely, no dangerous viruses should be employed,
and the safety and effectiveness of any such procedures should be
evaluated very closely.27
The AMA’s statement on gene-transfer asserts that there
should be no germ-line modification at this time because of
the “welfare of future generations and its association with
risks and potential for unpredictable and irreversible results.”
Nontherapeutic applications of gene-transfer are “contrary
to the ethical traditions of medicine and against the egalitarian
values of society.” Such uses of gene-transfer can be undertaken
only if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1)
there is a clear and meaningful benefit to the affected person,
(2) there is no “trade off” with other characteristics or
traits, and (3) “all citizens would have equal access to the
technology, irrespective of income or other socioeconomic
characteristics.”28
IV. Conclusion
The ability to modify human traits and characteristics at the
beginning of life is not on the immediate horizon. Gene-transfer,
though still experimental, may be perfected sooner than artificial
chromosomes and similar high-tech approaches. Federal regulation
of research (NIH) and clinical trials (FDA) is fairly strong
in this area, and tort litigation may provide additional strength
to ensure the safety of such experiments and techniques. The
regulations are chiefly aimed at the safety of human subjects
and at the safety and efficacy of the gene-therapy products
themselves. While it does not have formal approval authority,
the NIH’s RAC publicly discusses and explores the ethical concerns
implicated by innovations in this area. But such deliberation
tends to focus on safety issues, not on the broader ethical
issues relating to the character of human procreation or the
significance of increasing the genetic control of parents over
offspring. The states have not been actively legislating in
this area.
_________________
FOOTNOTES
i.
Some commentators prefer the term “inheritable genetic
modification” rather than “germ-line modification,” because
there are means of effecting heritable genetic change
that do not involve gene-transfer into the reproductive
cells. Such alternatives include ooplasm transfer or ovum
nuclear transplantation, both of which can result in inheritance
of the mitochondrial DNA from the donor of the ooplasm
or ovum.
ii.
Many gene-transfer studies are aimed at multigenic disease,
diseases that are caused by mixed genetic-environmental
favors, and even totally environmental disorders such
as infectious diseases.
iii.
It bears noting that most of the children treated in these
studies are well and apparently normal up to four years
or more after treatment. Most of the treated children
have not (as yet) shown any problems.
iv.
Newman, S., Department of Cell Biology and Anatomy, New
York Medical College, written comments submitted to the
President’s Council on Bioethics, April 2003. He writes:
“Laboratory experience shows that insertion of foreign
DNA into inopportune sites in an embryo’s chromosomes
can lead to extensive perturbation of development. For
example, the disruption of a normal gene by insertion
of foreign DNA in a mouse caused abnormal circling behavior
when present in one copy, lack of eye development, lack
of development of the semicircular canals of the inner
ear and anomalies of the olfactory epithelium (the tissue
that mediates the sense of smell), when mice were inbred
so that mutation appeared in the homozygous form (that
is, on both copies of the relevant chromosome). Another
such ‘insertional mutagenesis’ event led to a strain of
mice that exhibited limb, brain and craniofacial malformations,
as well as displacement of the heart to the right side
of the chest, in the homozygous state. Each of these developmentalanomaly
syndromes were previously unknown. From current, or even
anticipated models for the relationship between genes
and organismal forms and functions, the prediction of
complex phenotypes on the basis of knowledge of the gene
sequence inserted or disrupted is likely to remain elusive.
. . . During [embryonic] development, [gene alteration]
is much more complicated [than in a developed individual].
Tissues and organs are taking form during this period,
and the activity of genes is anything but modular. During
development many, if not most, gene products can have
multiple effects on the architecture of organs and the
wiring of the nervous system, including the brain. Individuals
produced by developmental intervention (particularly as
it comes to extend beyond the single gene, to chromosomes
or groups of chromosomes) could turn out to be ‘experimental
artifacts,’ in the sense that their bodies and mentalities
could be quite different from those of anyone generated
by natural processes using standard starting materials
(including by IVF).”
v.
In an earlier report, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology
and the Pursuit of Happiness, the Council discussed
in great detail the reasons why this prospect is unlikely
(see especially pp. 37-40). (The President’s Council on
Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit
of Happiness, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 2003.)
vi.
Because all gene-therapy is currently understood as experimental,
recipients of gene-therapy are considered human subjects
with all the attendant protections of the Common Rule
and FDA safeguards. An embryo, however, is not a “human
subject” for purposes of these protections, though parents
(certainly the mothers) would qualify as subjects in the
context of ex utero gene modification. Human subjects
protections reach embryos once they are implanted in vivo,
as discussed in Chapter 5.
vii.
As discussed in Chapter 2, an article may be regulated
both as a drug and a biologic, if it satisfies both definitions—which
are very expansive.
viii.
It may be the case, however, that the FDA does consider
potential danger to the embryo in setting policy, even
if its strict legal jurisdiction gives it no authority
or grounds to do so.
ix.
The Grimes Court seems to qualify this view somewhat
later, stating that parents may not authorize the exposure
of their children to more than minimal risk in studies
that offer no prospect of benefit to such children. This
view more closely tracks the federal guidelines.
_________________
Endnotes
1.
Blaese, R., et al., “T Lymphocyte-Directed Gene Therapy
for ADA-SCID: Initial Trial Results After Four Years,” Science
270: 475-480 (1995).
3.
Newman, S., “Human Developmental Modification: Prospects
and Perils,” statement submitted to the President’s Council
on Bioethics by The Council for Responsible Genetics (April
2003).
4.
Chan, A., et al., “Transgenic Monkeys Produced by Retroviral
Gene Transform into Mature Oocytes,” Science 291:
309-312 (2001).
5.
Larin, Z., et al., “Advances in Human Artificial Chromosome
Technology,” Trends in Genetics 18: 313-319 (2002).
6.
Collins, F., presentation at the December 13, 2002, meeting
of the President’s Council on Bioethics, Washington, D.C.,
available at www.bioethics.gov.
7.
49 Fed. Reg. 50,878-01 (December 31, 1984).
10.
58 Fed. Reg. 53,248-01 (October 14, 1993).
11.
58 Fed. Reg. 53,249 (October 14, 1993).
13.
Public Health Service Act § 351(a), 42 U.S.C. 262(a).
17.
National Institutes of Health, “NIH Guidelines for Research
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines),” April
2002, Appendix M.
19.
NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, “Frequently Asked
Questions,” op. cit.
22.
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
793 P.2d 479, 486 (Ca. 1990).
23.
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,
782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001).
24.
Keeton, W., et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts §32 at 187 (5th ed., 1984).
25.
Enright v. Eli Lilly, 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991).
27.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association. Opinion 2.13, “Genetic Engineering.” In: Code
of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations.
Chicago, Illinois: American Medical Association, 2002.
28.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association. Opinion 2.11, “Gene Therapy.” In: Code of
Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations. Chicago,
Illinois: American Medical Association, 2002.
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